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Abstract:
In the present paper, we stress the importance of the concept respect in a wide variety of so-
cial settings and provide a working definition of this concept by emphasizing how respect re-
lates to the act of communicating full recognition to other people on the dimensions of be-
longingness and morality. Subsequently, in two separate parts, we discuss why respect is so
desired and valued. The first part looks at respect as a means to fulfil important human social
concerns (“respect as a means to an end”). The second part looks at the potential moral un-
derpinnings of respect and thus interprets “respect as an end in itself.” Finally, it is suggested
that both reasons to value respect explain respect effects as a function of the working self-
concept that is salient (i.e., pragmatic versus idealistic self).
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Zusammenfassung:
Im vorliegenden Beitrag unterstreichen wir die Bedeutung des Respektkonzepts für eine Viel-
zahl sozialer Situationen. Wir geben eine Arbeitsdefinition vor, in der wir betonen, dass Re-
spekt die volle Anerkennung anderer Personen über Dimensionen der Zugehörigkeit und der
Moral kommuniziert. Danach, diskutieren wir in zwei Abschnitten, warum Respekt begehrt
und gewertschätzt wird. Der erste Abschnitt fokussiert auf „Respekt als ein Mittel zum
Zweck“, um wichtige menschliche soziale Belange zu erfüllen. Der zweite Teil fokussiert auf
den möglichen moralischen Unterbau von Respekt und interpretiert „Respekt als ein Zweck
in sich selbst“. Schließlich, wird vorgeschlagen, dass diese beiden Gründe Respekt wertzu-
schätzen die Effekte von Respekt im Sinne einer Funktionserfüllung des jeweils salienten
Selbst-Konzeptes (also, ideales versus pragmatisches Selbst) erklären können.
Schlüsselwörter: Respekt, Bedürfnisse, Zugehörigkeit, Selbstwertgefühl, Moral
Introduction
Respect is a “buzz” word in our contemporary society. In our newspapers we daily read
stories about football players who have to sit on the substitute bench and, in response,
demand more respect from the coach and the club (even though they earn large amounts
of money, regardless whether they play or not). In organizations, employees encounter
situations in which they feel that they are not listened to and that their ideas and sug-
gestions even are ignored. As a result, many of them may engage in acts of sabotage or
leave the organization in a disappointed manner because they did not feel respected. In
our close relationships, partners may show less commitment to the other and the rela-
tionship as a whole when they notice that their partner hardly devotes any attention to
their needs and problems. In these situations it is often sighted “ ... he or she does not
respect me.”1
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These situations point out a concern that most people have experienced, that is, “Do
others respect me or not?”  Throughout our society (e.g. organizations, teams, close re-
lationships, customer relationships etc.) there is an increasing demand for respect (Hill
jr., 2000; O’ Connell, 2000), leading people to ever-greater concerns about whether
such respect has been granted. Moreover, as the examples above show, concerns for re-
spect can in fact be found across a wide variety of situations. Indeed, our own experi-
ences make clear that respect is valued in situations where we meet friends, in interac-
tions with unknown others, and even so in economic exchanges in which outcomes and
financial concerns drive the interaction and where one wishes to appear as a tough ne-
gotiator. As a matter of fact, Lax and Sebenius (1986, p. 74) noted that “negotiator’s
interests can go beyond the obvious and tangible” and they also noted that “take for ex-
ample, the almost universal quest for social approval or the simple pleasure one derives
from being treated with respect, even in a one-time encounter.”
Thus, it is clear that in our social lives respect constitutes an important outcome that
we wish others allocate to us. So, how do we conceptualize respect? In the present pa-
per, we borrow from insights in recent social psychological research on respect. More
precisely, in our view, respect signals a full recognition as a person, which holds the as-
sumption that respect provides information about our status, prestige and a feeling of
being accepted by others in our groups and community (De Cremer, 2002, 2003; De
Cremer & Tyler, 2005a,).2 In a way, respect among group members thus signals that
you as a person are an equal to others (Simon, Lucken & Stürmer, 2006). Moreover, we
argue that feeling an equal in terms of status and belongingness also communicates that
you are treated with the same dignity and moral worth as any other. This relates to the
concept of respect as something that every human being has a claim to (as it makes us
all dignified humans living in a moral community). As Kant (Hill, 2000, p. 64) noted,
“it is a duty to respect others as human beings”, so every human being is equal in the
sense that they have equal worth and deserve equal respect.
Building on the above, this issue of feeling recognized (as a function of respect)
therefore can be seen as reflecting two views of respect that suggest why we value re-
spect so much. That is, respect is a concept that has the potential to (a) fulfil the needs
of the person (such as belongingness and reputation) in his or her social life (i.e., “re-
spect as a means to an end”), and (b) affirm the moral values that we wish to live by and
which makes up for our moral community (i.e., “respect as an end in itself”).
Respect as a Means to an End: Serving the Human Needs of
Belongingness and Reputation
The “Respect as Intragroup Status” model (RIS; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005b) explores
how respect communicates intragroup information and which identity concerns are in-
volved. The model poses that feeling recognized by others includes receiving a rela-
tional appreciation from those others. This happens in two ways. First, respect can be
seen as a signal that one belongs to the group or community and second, that one is
evaluated positively and has a positive status or reputation within this group or commu-
nity. In other words, respect indicates that one is included in the group and that one has
a good reputation in the eyes of fellow group members. These two aspects lead people
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to consider themselves as having a positive status within the own group or community.
The RIS model emerged from the relational models of procedural justice (De Cremer &
Tyler, 2005c; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). According to these relational
models, one important type of information that provides us with cues about our standing
in our relationships with others is the fairness of procedures enacted by the group and its
members. Research on procedural fairness has indeed shown that the use of fair proce-
dures positively influences people’s self-regard and identity (e.g., Koper, van Knippen-
berg, Bouhuijs, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1993).  The reason for this is that fair procedures
communicate to people that they are perceived as having a respected position within the
group.  In other words, they feel recognized as a member having important relational
value to the group. Therefore, in these relational models, respect is seen as an important
indicator of intragroup status.  In line with this proposition, research indeed shows that
people’s judgments about their standing within the group, and their associated feelings
of self-regard, are enhanced when they receive respectful treatment by the group and its
authorities (Boeckman & Tyler, 2002; Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996).  As such, respect
is considered not as something that people simply intuit by themselves, but rather as a
judgment that emerges from the treatment they receive from others.
Thus, respect informs people that they have a valued status in a relationship. But
why is this so important for people? As argued before, the RIS model (De Cremer &
Tyler, 2005b) answers to this by posing that having a valued status in a relationship
satisfices 1) the need to be belong and 2) the need to have a positive social reputation in
the eyes of others. Respect specifically fulfils these needs.
Let us first address belongingness needs. Several lines of research point to the con-
clusion that people are social beings in that they use their relationships with other indi-
viduals or groups to define their social self (Aron & Aron, 1986). A crucial aspect in
this self-definitional process is that people pursue a sense of inclusion – a tendency that
is believed to be inherent to human beings in general (Kurzban & Leary, 2001). Re-
search on the need to belong (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Gardner, Pickett, &
Brewer, 2000; Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke, 2001; Twenge, Catanese, & Bau-
meister, 2002), indeed demonstrates that people are fundamentally motivated to be in-
cluded in groups and relationships that they consider to be important to them.  As a re-
sult, people are very attentive toward any type of relational information communicated
by others, but particularly so when their need to belong is unfulfilled.  The importance
and pervasiveness of this need to belong has been shown by research demonstrating that
a lack of positive social relationships has detrimental effects on the physical, cognitive
and behavioral level (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Reis, Collins, & Berscheid, 2000).
For example, not feeling accepted by others influences well-being negatively, reinforces
selective memory for socially relevant information and undermines intrinsic motivation
(e.g., Berscheid & Reis, 1998; Gardner, Gabriel, & Diekman, 2000; Gardner, Pickett, &
Brewer, 2000), whereas fulfilling the need to belong positively influences cooperative
behavior within groups (De Cremer & Leonardelli, 2003).
With regard to the issue of respect, De Cremer and Tyler (2005a) have shown that
need to belong affected the impact of receiving respect. When their concerns to belong
were made salient, people showed stronger emotional reactions, were more cooperative,
or more likely to exit the group. Moreover, De Cremer (2003a) further showed that the
positive effect of respect on cooperation in pubic good dilemmas was mediated by
feelings of belonginess. These findings support the notion that people value respect out
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of a concern to belong. Interestingly, these results are also in line with the relational
equilibrium model (REM) which addresses the role of respect in leadership (see De
Cremer, 2003b). According to REM, respect has a positive influence on leadership ef-
fectiveness because followers attend to relational information such as respect as a func-
tion of their individual belongingness needs and their sense of belongingness as sig-
naled by their group membership at hand (in addition to a base rate or equilibrium inde-
pendent of their belongingness needs).
The second result of receiving respect is that it fulfills our concern for a positive
reputation. As early as the writings of James (1890), researchers acknowledge that one’s
identity is, at least partly, determined by one’s social reputation.  Indeed, because social
evaluation is an important element in the process of constructing the self and identity,
people are, by their very nature, motivated to obtain a positive image or reputation (see
e.g., the extensive literature on people’s public self-presentation skills; Baumeister,
1982; Leary, 2001). In fact, social reputations largely determine how one’s behaviors
are recognized and rewarded (e.g., Johnson, Erez, Kiker, & Motowidlo, 2002). Reputa-
tion, then, is a prized possession to be protected or augmented because of its implica-
tions for the kind of person one is in both interpersonal as group settings. The powerful
effects of social reputation in groups has, for example, been demonstrated by recent re-
search showing that people can exhibit more cooperative behavior to confirm either
their positive reputation or to allow them to obtain such a positive evaluation (e.g., De
Cremer, Snyder, & Dewitte, 2001).
With regard to the issue of respect, De Cremer and Tyler (2005a) have shown that
reputation concerns affected the impact of receiving respect. When concerns for reputa-
tion were strong, respect affected people’s emotional response and their self-esteem to a
larger extent. This supports the notion that people value respect because respect caters
to reputational concerns.
To summarize so far, the RIS model puts forward that respect communicates a val-
ued intragroup status and in this way satisfices two important identity needs, that is, the
search to belong and establish a favorable reputation. Of course, satisfying needs and
social concerns leads people, in general, to feel better about themselves may thus influ-
ence their level of self-esteem. As a matter of fact, our idea that these two social con-
cerns impact upon people’s self-esteem aligns well with sociometer’s theory’s proposal
that a vital function of self-esteem is to monitor and communicate to the individual the
degree of social acceptance (Leary & Baumeister, 2000). Thus, self-esteem reflects per-
ceptions of inclusionary status (Gailliot & Baumeister, in press).
This idea of impacting self-esteem is also very relevant to what happens within
groups. In fact, recently, group research has begun to devote more attention to the role that
members’ self-esteem plays in terms of group functioning (e.g., McAllister & Bigley,
2002). More precisely, in the last decade it has become increasingly clear that self-esteem
is not only an important psychological need, but also an important economic need (Bran-
den, 1998).  That is, self-esteem plays a role in how people evaluate themselves and how
efficacious they feel. These feelings, in turn, are of major (economic) importance in the
process of how employees, at different levels in the organization, reason, decide, and
regulate action.  Moreover, research has also demonstrated that individuals with high and
low self-esteem react differently toward conflict situations, and task interdependence, and
perceive relationships with others in the group as serving different functions (Brockner,
1988; Duffy, Shaw, & Stark, 2000; Leary & Baumeister, 2000).
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What to conclude from this perspective of respect as a means to an end? This per-
spective advocates the use of respect as an important means to satisfy needs that help us
to evaluate our standing within the group or community that one is a member of. How-
ever, this perspective also implies that respect addresses the satisfaction of an individual
need and not necessarily a collective need. Indeed, it is the individual drive of need to
belong and need for a favorable reputation that makes us so susceptible to information
about respect. As such, it seems like individuals value respect within groups merely to
fulfill their own individual needs rather than those of the group. Indeed, also Heuer,
Penrod, Hafer, and Cohn (2002) noted that “people care about respect because of what it
conveys about others’ valuation of their worth as individuals rather than its group-based
connotations”. In a way, this observation may even signal a certain rise of individualism
in group settings. That is, group members seem to be active participants that contribute
to group life and productivity as a function of how they have been treated by the group
(see also Simon & Stürmer, 2003).
However, we also wish to argue that this individualistic view of why people value
respect does not necessarily tell the whole story. We wish to emphasize that respect
does not only have to be looked upon as an individual-based driven concept. Indeed, in
the next section we adopt the second perspective of “respect as an end in itself”. This
perspective will make clear that respect is also something that can be endorsed out of
more collective values.
Respect as an End in Itself: Respect as a Gatekeeper of the
Moral Community
This second perspective suggests that respect can be seen as a value that we strive for,
regardless of any individual or instrumental benefits. It implies the idea that we like to
be respected because we feel that we should or ought to respect people, because it is
an innate human value (and is thus not driven solely by personal desires). This idea
aligns well with Kant and his categorical imperative (Hill, 2000, p. 39), which holds
that moral behaviour is an end in itself because of “a rational moral requirement for
everyone that is not based or conditional on its serving one’s contingent personal
ends.”
Using this second perspective suggests that respect is not valued because out of per-
sonal needs that need to be satisfied, but because it is a universal law dictating that re-
spect is an ought or even a moral duty. In this way, respect can be seen as a moral
building stone or even gatekeeper for a moral and humanitarian community. From this
point of view, the second perspective thus indeed treats respect as a community or col-
lective-based value. As a matter of fact, as we know, communities and collectives fare
well if it has principles guiding social behaviour. One important class of principles are
those addressing ethical and moral issues.
Ethical principles tell us what’s important and how we ought to treat other human
beings; one important principle being to approach others in respectful ways (Miller,
2001). Thus, as ethical individuals we consider respect as something that is a duty and
therefore we automatically submit to this ethical principle. As such, giving respect to
others is something that should happen without any hesitation and cognitive delibera-
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tion. In fact, one may even argue that respect as an important ethical principle is hard-
wired and makes that we can live in a moral and humanitarian community.
Following from the above line of reasoning, we thus can say that the perspective
“respect as an end in itself” suggests that the act of giving respect is a basic and moral
undertaking that helps us to develop humanitarian and dignified social relationships, ul-
timately affirming the existence of a moral community. Such a moral community is re-
garded as relatively cohesive, because independent of talents, accomplishments, and so-
cial status, each person is to be regarded as having a special worth that we always must
take into account. As such, this second perspective also shows again that respect can
serve as “social glue” in our social lives.
If respect helps to build up this moral and humanitarian community, a subsequent
assumption is that it should be internalized in such a way that we are willing to sacri-
fice our interests, maybe even our lives to ensure that respect is maintained or even
reinforced. In fact, if respect is an internalized value then a violation of it should rep-
resent a threat to ethical principles and just world beliefs of all kinds, making that sac-
rificing behaviour will be evoked to affirm the presence of respect.  Recent research
on altruistic punishment supports the idea that people are willing to sacrifice for the
existence of moral values such as respect. More precisely, this line of research has
shown that people are indeed willing to incur personal costs to pursue morality and
justice. That is, when observing an individual cheating on someone else, people are
willing to punish this individual, even when they themselves were not harmed by the
cheating and even when the punishment is costly for them (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003;
Fehr & Gächter, 2002). This line of research thus emphasizes the important argument
that people are, beyond their self-interest, concerned with safeguarding moral and just
behavior. In a similar vein, it can be suggested that respect is a moral value that we
automatically share with others and therefore are willing to preserve at any (personal)
cost.
Thus, respect can also represent an important value in itself because respect as an
end in itself makes us dignified and ethical humans beings. Interestingly, if people can
also value respect because of its moral connotations, then it may be very likely that re-
spect as an end in itself will impact upon people’s self-esteem as well. Indeed, research,
for example, shows that people like to evaluate themselves as morally superior to others
(Epley & Dunning, 2000). Moreover, recent theoretical perspectives on self-esteem also
argue that self-esteem reflects, at least in part, perspectives of worldview validation
(Pyszcynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004). As respect can also be
seen as a confirmation of us living in a moral community, it may thus also elevate our
self-esteem as authentic and dignified human beings.
When does Need Satisfaction versus Moral Principles
determine the Value of Respect the Most?
If respect is to be valued for different reasons (as a means to an end or an end in itself)
will there be differences among people who wish to pursue respect for one value or the
other? Building upon the idea that people’s self can take different forms and conse-
quently affect how people’s attention is directed, we put forward the suggestion that the
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reason why respect is important to people is a function of whether their pragmatic ver-
sus idealistic self is most salient.
The self can be seen as a multifaceted and dynamic structure containing knowledge
about one’s own thoughts, attitudes, motives and feelings (Leary, 2001). This view im-
plies that people have different self-representations that can be active at different times
and in different situations. Indeed, the self is not uni-dimensional (Markus & Wurf,
1987). People have distinct selves and each of these selves involves goals, values and
beliefs. Once these goals and values are accessible and salient they will energize and di-
rect our actions (Carver, 2001). Moreover, the self is also very dynamic, which means
that at any specific point in time or in any specific situation another type of self can be
active. As a result, this active type of self will then have specific cognitive, affective,
and behavioral consequences (e.g., Lord, Brown, & Freiberg, 1999). The type of self
that is active is usually referred to as the working self-concept (Markus & Wurf, 1987).
Here, we argue that two specific types of working self-concepts may exert strong
effects on the reasons why people value respect. More precisely, we argue that if the
pragmatic self is active then people value respect because it satisfies their needs. On the
other hand, if the idealistic self is active then people value respect in itself. The prag-
matic self has been found to be more sensitive to situational opportunities that can help
facilitating actions and the attainment of desirable goals (Kivetz & Tyler, 2007). The
fulfilment of concerns of belongingness and reputation may represent such desirable
goals. Moreover, the pragmatic self also is more realistic and tuned in on the moment,
that is, when this self-concept is active people focus more strongly on means that may
be useful at the present moment (i.e., proximal time perspective; Trope & Liberman,
2003).
The idealistic self, however, is more occupied with stressing the importance of val-
ues and principles above practical considerations. Therefore, this type of working self-
concept makes people more closely related to their sense of true self. As a result, when
this type of self is salient then people do not focus so much on the present moment but
also more on the longer-term issues (i.e., Trope & Liberman, 2003).
It has to be noted that the immediate (and self-interested) consequences derived
from looking at means satisfying needs at the present moment is often so pervasive that
the idealistic self is not always activated (cf. Markus & Kunda, 1986). This observation
may explain, at least to a certain extent, that ethical and moral values are often sup-
pressed and less influential on people’s actions. Interestingly, this assumption actually
can be seen as reflected in how many of our social interactions nowadays take the form
of an economic exchange in which respect is often treated as the exchange of a specific
type of resource that needs to be reciprocated immediately (i.e., respect in this context
has an hedonic value rather than a moral value).
Conclusion
To conclude, in the present paper we have described two perspectives that provide two
reasons why people care about respect and why it is such a valuable good in our rela-
tionships with others. Based on our prior research (the RIS model; De Cremer & Tyler,
2005b), we first argued that respect is a means to an end. Indeed, receiving respectful
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treatment signals relational appreciation and satisfies important human motives such as
belongingness and reputation concerns. A second reason is that respect can also be seen
as an end in itself. That is, giving respect is important in our social relationships because
it is something that we morally expect and the enactment of respect itself makes us
authentic and moral human beings. As a result, respect serves as an important building
stone of a moral community. Interestingly, in this analysis we note that the perspective
“respect as a means to an end” may be something that is very much a question arising
from people’s individual needs, whereas the perspective “respect as an end in itself”
represents a call from the society as a whole to ensure the morality of the collective we
live in. Finally, we argued that the importance of both perspectives in explaining respect
effects might be a function of the working self-concept that is active, that is, pragmatic
or idealistic self. We hope that the present theoretical contribution may inspire social
science researchers to deepen our understanding further to explaining why respect mat-
ters and when it may be most needed.
Notes
1 The attentive reader will notice that these examples only refer to possible negative aspects of
respect. This does not imply, however, that there are no positive aspects to respect. In fact, an
abundance of examples exist illustrating that employees frequently prefer working in organi-
zations where they are certain that they will receive respect from their employers rather than
moving to a competing firm where they definitely will receive higher financial outcomes, but
where they are uncertain about receiving respectful treatment. In our introduction, we used
primarily examples focusing on people’s complaints about the lack of respect because espe-
cially under such circumstances it becomes clear that people very much value the presence of
respectful treatment (i.e., the lack of respect can be said to loom larger than the presence of
respect, see Baumeister et al., 2000).
2 Our definition of respect (as presented in this article) is grounded in the social justice litera-
ture, but, of course, other perspectives exist as well. Dillon (http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/respect/) provides a very detailed account of the different dimensions that the concept
of respect entails. In his theoretical account, Dillon refers to respect as a behavior but also as
an attitude and feeling. In fact, respect is something that takes place when a subject responds
to an object from the perspective that bestowing respect is a good and appropriate thing to
do. The object can take different forms such as the self, another person, or nature in itself.
3 Parts of this article were written when the first author was a research fellow at the Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University, which was also partly sponsored by the “Jonge
Akademie” of the Royal Dutch Society of Sciences (KNAW).
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